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Abstract 
 
Philosophical views about the logical structure of time are typically divided between proponents of A and 
B theories, based on McTaggart's A and B series. Drawing on Paul Ricoeur's hermeneutic phenomenology, 
I develop and defend McTaggart's thesis that the C series and the A series working together give a 
consistent description of temporal experience, provided that the two series are regarded as distinct 
dimensions internal to time. In the proposed two-dimensional model, the C series expresses a nesting 
order of the constitutive states of a world, whereas ontological continuity and change are properties of 
the A series. This, I argue, allows for limited backward causation.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the publication of "The Unreality of Time" (McTaggart 1908) the debate about the logical structure 
of time was dominated by two vocal camps, one maintaining that time can be fully explained in terms of 
the A series (future, present, past), the other advocating the explanatory primacy of the B series (before, 
after), notwithstanding the lack of consensus on whether and how the A series and the B series overlap in 
their logical properties. Little attention was given to the C series (a ⊂ b ⊂ c ...), signifying a nesting order 
(included in, inclusive of)1, which McTaggart combined with the A series to give a logically complete 
description of time: "the A series, together with the C series, is sufficient to give us time." (1908, 463) 
McTaggart has promptly rejected this combination of series, believing that "the application of the A series 
to reality involves a contradiction" (1908, 470), but I will argue there are good reasons to accept his 
hypothetical schema, provided that the C series and the A series are treated as distinct dimensions 
internal to time.  
 
A parallel but somewhat disconnected development of time-theory took place among proponents of 
hermeneutic phenomenology, led by Paul Ricoeur and Hayden White, attempting to understand time in 
terms of episodic and configurational dimensions associated with the process of communication and 
exemplified in the construction of narratives. I will attempt to show that hermeneutic phenomenology 
gives support to McTaggart's controversial view. I will then examine some phenomenological aspects of 
temporal experience and defend a new, two-dimensional formulation of the C+A schema against one-
dimensional models and other combinations of McTaggart's series. 
 
 
2. Two Dimensions of Time 
 
It is a fundamental postulate of science that causes precede their effects. Nevertheless, "In all sciences, the 
ordinary approach is from the effects to the causes. The effect raises the problem (...) and the scientist 
tries to solve it by constructing an explanatory hypothesis." (Popper 1979, 115) This occurs in such a way 
                                           
1 McTaggart (1908, 462) initially defined the C series as "not temporal, for it involves no change but only 
an order" and "while it determines the order [it] does not determine the direction." Later he adds: "Of any 
two terms in the C series, one is included in the other, which includes the first, and by means of these 
relations all the terms can be arranged in one definite order." (1927, §566) He subsequently argued that 
the C series based on the logic of inclusion has an intrinsic direction, but I will contest this conclusion. 
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that the identity of events or states of the past may be subject to future revisions. Such retroactive 
changes are then rationalised as corrections of past errors of identification, but this does not fully 
reinstate temporal consistency. A scientific view of the past may endure unchanged in regard to its 
theoretic content, but its relations and therefore identity may be retroactively altered by the shifting 
context of the present. Another way, the concepts we use to describe the past may be nominally, 
linguistically or formally identical to those we held in the past, but how those enduring concepts relate to 
the concepts developed later may alter their historical meaning. On this view, identity is not a fixed 
reference, not an invariant given, but is mind-dependent insofar as it must be meaningful in order to be 
anything at all. Without a framework of conscious identification the past has no temporal identity, 
therefore no reality; as the meaning-content of consciousness changes so does the historical identity of 
the content. I call this effect 'weak backward causation', in contrast to 'strong backward causation' 
associated with a past event P being altered by an event E occurring at a later time, in a world where 
alteration of P implies negation of E, therefore E implies negation of E; a situation which is paradoxical 
(∃E:E≠E→⊥).2 
 
Henri Bergson has famously argued that the cause of experience does not precede the experience but 
succeeds it, insofar as phenomena can be rationalised in terms of causes only retrospectively. "Backwards 
over the course of time a constant remodelling of the past by the present, of the cause by the effect, is 
being carried out." (Bergson 1946, 122) This, I argue, is not a paradox; the cause and the effect referred to 
in this description belong to different causal orders, physical and metaphysical. The distinction is roughly 
equivalent to the perception that something has happened in a particular order vs. the order in which the 
idea of what has happened evolves. Another way, the order of changes in things (object-level) is not the 
same as the order of changes in the ideas that refer to those things (meta-level). According to 
hermeneutic phenomenology, these two orders cannot be consistently integrated in one-dimensional 
time but require two mutually irreducible dimensions internal to time. 
 
Ricoeur (1984, 66) identifies "two temporal dimensions, one chronological and the other not. The former 
constitutes the episodic dimension of narrative. It characterizes the story insofar as it is made up of 
events. The second is the configurational dimension properly speaking, thanks to which the plot 
transforms the events into a story. This configurational act consists of 'grasping together' the detailed 
actions or what I have called the story's incidents. It draws from this manifold of events the unity of one 
temporal whole." 
 
The hypothesis of episodic and configurational dimensions internal to time neatly explains why 
information does not need to be arranged and revealed in a strictly chronological order for the unified 
course of time to be conveyed to the interlocutor. Experiences may be scattered, composed of temporally 
dispersed fragments, and yet if the information-content is logically consistent a unified temporal order of 
the story is bound to emerge. Our indisputable ability to "draw a configuration out of a simple succession" 
(Ricoeur 1984, 65), especially if the sequence of narration does not follow the narrated evental order, 
reveals that temporality is analysable as a mode of grasping the multiple in a unified context. We are thus 
able to meaningfully differentiate between the temporal order of communication – or what we call the 
'real time' – and the temporal order within the narrative – the time we are conscious of when following a 
story. We experience phenomena happening in real time, but the identity of events, insofar as these are 
parts of a meaningful process, inescapably remains in the configurational dimension which does not 
follow the temporal logic of phenomena. An event might have only a brief duration in the first dimension 
but evolves indefinitely in the other, as a mythical split, a right angle divergence from the experiential 
axis. The meaning of phenomenal change can also change, in effect changing history, and this is a point 
where hermeneutic phenomenology resonates with McTaggart's argument against the reality of time. 
 
McTaggart's (1908, 468) (1927, §329-333) argument that all events possess contradictory properties of 
being past, present and future implies that events happen at a particular time but also persist indefinitely 
and change in their temporal properties, but this leads to an obvious contradiction if time is one-
dimensional. To solve McTaggart's paradox we can posit two temporal dimensions, one applicable to the 
experiential order of changes in things (phenomena) signified by ideas and the other to the order of 
changes in ideas signifying those things. I will develop this argument in the subsequent sections, but from 
the outset I want to address one possible objection, namely, that we can know things only in terms of 
                                           
2 There may be other types of backwards causation which are not paradoxical, in addition to what I call 
weak and strong types. In any case, the proposed theory of time can model weak backward causation only. 
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ideas, which are objects of thought, therefore we need only one-dimensional time: the timeline of thought. 
This would certainly account for the direction and the order of the subjective thought process, but the 
sense of having ideas, their meaning, is precisely that they signify something more than just thoughts. It is 
immaterial whether what we call 'objective reality' has existence independent of ideas or whether it is 
composed only of ideas that are grounded in a special way, because what matters to us is the distinction 
between the objective and the subjective which is indispensible to thought. Conversely, the objection that 
time is real independently of the mind and that temporality of thought is only a representation of this 
non-mental reality would be entirely missing its mark, insofar as the present study is concerned with the 
logical structure of temporal experience insofar as we are conscious of it, irrespective of whether 
'objective reality' has existence independent of consciousness.   
 
The takeaway from this section is that our experience of time, or rather, our conscious experience in time, 
seems to proceed along two temporal dimensions. This twofold structure of time, consisting of the 
timeline of phenomenal experience (episodic dimension) and the timeline of historical identity-formation 
(configurational dimension) can be described within the theoretic limits of McTaggart's model, whose A 
series coordinates the historical dimension in terms of past, present and future; the B series defines the 
sequence of evental succession in terms of before and after; and the C series signifies a nesting order. I 
will present further reasons why a two-dimensional model of time is necessary and argue that no other 
combination of McTaggart's series can consistently describe how phenomena are integrated in time. 
 
 
3. A and B Series are Not Time 
 
In the previous section I have argued that phenomena and the process of identifying those phenomena as 
meaningful events in the historical process involve two temporal dimensions: the timeline of phenomenal 
experience and the timeline of historical identity-formation. The first timeline corresponds to the order of 
changes from one phenomenal state to another; the second timeline corresponds to the order of changes 
in the historical identities of things undergoing the changes of state. These two dimensions can be 
plausibly defined within the theoretic limits of McTaggart's (1908) model. I consider whether A and B 
series can accomplish this task, either independently or in combination. The following discussion is by no 
means a comprehensive account of A and B theories. I focus on only those implications of the A and B 
series that I consider particularly problematic or helpful in justifying my decision to pursue the C+A 
schema. 
 
In the wake of McTaggart, numerous attempts have been made to account for the A series in terms of the 
B series or for the B series in terms of the A series in order to demonstrate superiority of one theoretic 
approach over the other. Mellor (1998), a proponent of the B-theory of time, defines the meaning of past, 
present and future according to the following B-theoretic formula: 
 
'<e> is past' is true at any time <t> iff <e> is earlier than <t> 
 
The proposed expression appears problematic as it attempts to define the terms of a time series in terms 
of time per se. In defence of Mellor, the apparent circularity is not necessarily vicious and can be (at least 
superficially) eliminated by assuming that <t> does not signify time per se but, following Heidegger on 
'datability' (1988, 262), another event standing-in as a quasi-temporal, contextual reference: 
 
'<e> is past' is true at any event <e'> iff <e> is earlier than <e'> 
 
The preposition 'at' in the above statement signifies simultaneity, which can be approximated in strictly 
B-theoretic terms as 'is (true), but not before and not after', but for simplicity I will assume that 'at' 
signifies just that. Despite the above adjustments the present formula is still too general to define the 
actual past, that is, the past which is relative to the present moment of lived experience, since it allows us 
to assign the quality of being 'now' to any event in the B series. The term 'now', which signifies the 
primitive 'present' of the A series, does not have a direct counterpart in the B series but, following Mellor 
(as reformulated above), can be expressed as follows: 
 
'<e> is present' is true at any event <e'> iff <e> is at <e'>  
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The event <e> is thus defined as present if and only if it is simultaneous with <e'>, but there is no 
indication whether the two events are simultaneous 'now'. Mellor (1998, 5) suggests that <e'> can be 
made coincidental with the present by definition, while Zimmerman (2005, 451-452) suggest that being 
present in B-theory is a primitive monadic property of being self-simultaneous. According to Zimmerman, 
being present is trivially true and what matters is being presently present: "To be presently present a time 
must both be present (a monadic feature that tenselessly applies to each time) and also be located in the 
moment that is being picked out by uses of 'now'". Assuming that Zimmerman does not imply that the 
'now' can be picked arbitrarily, being presently present is revealed as a synonym for the immanent 'now' 
of lived experience and thus implicates a primitive element from the A series as the truth-maker, thereby 
exceeding the scope of the B-theory. In the case of Mellor, to assign the 'now' to an arbitrary event by 
definition would be as nonsensical as identifying myself with an arbitrary object by definition (a 
proposition which Mellor op. cit. explicitly denies), because insofar as the present is the temporal locus of 
being it is equivalent to the sense of 'I am': "What occurs now is any event that is contemporaneous with 
the moment when I speak; reduced to itself, the self-reference of the moment of speech is simply the 
tautology of the living present." (Ricoeur 1992, 53) Without a purely B-theoretic means of identifying the 
immanent 'now' of lived experience (be it called the present or presently present) there can be no purely 
B-theoretic account of change, because change takes place exclusively as the present, and coincides with 
the contextually unique consciousness of the event. Mellor (1998, 47) concedes that "we cannot do 
without A-beliefs", but this raises a serious doubt whether the B series alone can satisfy the practical 
demands of lived experience. It seems that the problem of the present has not been satisfactorily resolved 
by proponents of the B-theory and I doubt whether it can be consistently resolved. 
 
Against the A-theoretic view, McTaggart (1908, 468) (1927, §329-333) has famously argued that we 
cannot define time in terms of past, present and future while also defining these as properties of events at 
different times, as that would lead to vicious infinite regress.3 The common objection to this charge is that 
nobody claims that the same event can have all these temporal properties with respect to any another 
event, and the dispute is rather about how to express this resolution within the theoretic limits of 
McTaggart's model. There is nonetheless a valid secondary implication to McTaggart's argument; we can 
justifiably claim that an event is exclusively past, or present, or future with respect to some other event, 
but not that the present event becomes a past event, because becoming indeed does imply the passage of 
time which is yet to be defined. This gives rise to the question whether any future event 'becoming' a 
present event and then 'becoming' a past event can be justifiably regarded as the same event. Clearly 
there is a logical difference between events imagined as the future, remembered from the past, and 
experienced in the present, even if all these scenarios are associated with the same nominal identity. 
When we objectify an event with an identity E, we are arguably equivocating between the event of 
thinking about E as an anticipation of its occurrence, the event of experiencing E as it happens, and the 
event of remembering E as it has happened, each event involving a different situation.  
 
Another objection to the A-theoretic account of time relates to the evental order within the past or the 
future. Working on the premise that the A series is directional, progressing from the future, to the 
present, to the past, it evidently has a basic order. On the other hand, statements which assert that an 
event 'will be present' or 'was future' may already involve both A and B series. Any tensed expressions 
applied to the past, present or future resemble the logic of the B series: 'will be' is equivalent to 'after the 
present', while 'was' is equivalent to 'before the present'. Were we to remain adamant to interpret tensed 
expressions in strictly A-theoretic terms by formulating them as 'of the future' and 'of the past', we would 
end up with a duplicitous set of temporal propositions in the same sentence, for example, 'will be present' 
would become 'of the future of the present', or, taking the logical reduction even further, 'of the not-
present of the present'. The problematic effect of applying tensed expressions to the primary terms of the 
A series has been emphasised by Mellor (1998, 73) by formulating barely comprehensible statements 
containing two or more tensed propositions stacked together, for example: "e will have been present". I 
understand this as either a case of combining two different ordering principles (A and B series, for 
example), or a case of circular reasoning consisting in application of an ordering principle to itself. The 
latter view is evidently untenable for reasons just discussed, but the former view seems consistent. If 
second-order ordering terms were applied to the first-order terms {(less → more) future → present → 
(less → more) past} we would end up with either a hybrid BA series, on one-dimension, or B+A theory on 
two dimensions. 
 
                                           
3 I have referred to this argument in the previous section for different reasons. 
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The takeaway here is that neither the A series nor the B series alone gives us a complete model of 
temporality. On the other hand, the A series cannot be dispensed with because it is the only series which 
stipulates the primitive present as the temporal locus of our consciousness of change. Irrespective of any 
deficiencies of the A and B series as self-standing models of temporality, we are already committed to 
constructing a two-dimensional model in order to account for the timeline of phenomenal change 
(episodic dimension) and the timeline of historical identity-formation (configurational dimension), and to 
resolve the contradiction identified by McTaggart in relation to the A series. The B+A theory of time 
seems to offer everything that C+A theory has to offer and more, but there are in fact some important 
differences that make the C series more fitting for the task at hand. Critically, modelling time by means of 
B and A series can result in temporal inconsistencies. I will justify this claim in the following section. 
 
 
4. Constitutive Order 
 
An object is said to be the same object only if it endures through change over a non-zero duration, what 
presupposes its past, present and future being consolidated under one identity, but the same object must 
also be able to accommodate constitutive transformations, that is, it must include a plurality of 
constitutive states that are not only ordered sequentially in terms of 'before' and 'after' but express 
ontological continuity from the state 'before' to the state 'after'. Another way, "The 'laws' of temporality 
determine not only a general sequence of before and after but also what comes before and what after." 
(Lauer 1965, 115) That x is 'before' y expresses only a sequence discrete, discontinuous states; it does not 
entail that x becomes y.4 This deficiency is the most apparent when dealing with duration, which can be 
expressed in strictly B-theoretic terms as follows: there are n cyclical states of type c after state-a but 
before state-b, so the period of time between a and b is n cycles/units of c. Let us now consider a case 
where the states of type c were observed in a dream, a signifies the state of being awake just before 
dreaming, and b signifies the state of being awake just after dreaming. All the above states are perceived 
in a neat chronological order, and yet if arranged in the experiential sequence in terms of 'before' and 
'after' they clearly lack either ontological continuity or temporal consistency. In order to preserve 
continuity and consistency, the B series associated with the states experienced in the dream could be 
nested inside a B series of states associated with being awake, but the ordering terms of the B series are 
not enough to make this second-order distinction. Alternatively, a single B series of objective, 
physiological states could be constructed, but such a series would conflict with the B series of the 
dreamer's experiential sequence. Either way, the decisive factor - ontological continuity - is not captured 
by the B series. The fact that we seamlessly detect ontological discontinuities in the phenomenal sequence 
of awake, asleep, awake suggests that the B series does not express the kind of relations that characterise 
how we integrate phenomena in time. In this regard the C series has a significant advantage over the B 
series, the former is already a hierarchy of structurally nested states and the latter is a flat, directional 
order of discrete states.  
 
McTaggart has described the C series as akin to assembly of parts constituting a phenomenological whole: 
a mereological hierarchy "found in a substance which is spiritual" (1927, §656). First he posits the idea of 
substance as something having content and parts: "The parts of such a whole will necessarily have some 
relations to each other, and the fact that it has these related parts is what I mean by its having internal 
structure." (McTaggart 1921, §171) He then explains the kind of internal structure he has in mind in 
regard to the C series: "Of any two terms in the C series, one is included in the other, which includes the 
first, and by means of these relations all the terms can be arranged in one definite order." (1927, §566) 
For example, the circle is a kind of geometric shape defined on a plane, what presupposes the idea of the 
plane as a section of space. Similarly, the concept of the cart incorporates the concept of the wheel, while 
every natural process inevitably implicates the entire constitutive order of nature: "all that exists, both 
substances and characteristics, are bound together in one system of extrinsic determination." (McTaggart 
1921, 151) Returning to the earlier example involving the transition from being awake to dreaming and 
to being awake again, we are acutely aware when something happening now does not constitutively 
follow from the immediately prior phenomenal conditions. Another way, we intuitively know when the 
prior experiential state is not constitutively nested in the present constitutive state.  
 
                                           
4 Moreover, "The ordering of 'positions' via B-relations does not make a series temporal." (Pezet 2019); 
"...it is precisely the idea of change or transition from the one to the other that it [the B-series] fails to 
capture." (Rundle 2009, 32) 
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The C series construed as a nesting order does seem to possess an intrinsic direction, and in contrast to 
the 1908 paper in which the C series was introduced, late McTaggart (1927, §723) attempted to 
demonstrate this directionality on the basis of what he calls "the last, and most inclusive term" in the C 
series, coincidental with the present and the future combined. I consider this part of McTaggart's 
argument problematic. One may contend that the idea of the 'last term' is already temporally biased and 
does not follow from the relations included in and inclusive of that characterise the C series. Specifically, 
describing a term as the last presupposes rather than demonstrates that all the other terms are 
temporally prior to this term and may constitute equivocation between 'the last' and 'the latest' (1927, 
§742, §827). It is also unclear why we should lump together the present state of the world and all the 
future states, when we do not do the same with respect to past states. Our temporal logic certainly does 
have a direction, we do think from conditions toward conditionals, from that which is presupposed 
toward that which presupposes, but this directionality does not seem to arise from the C series alone. In 
any case, this controversial feature is not necessary for the C+A model to work, assuming that the A-series 
is already directional, I will therefore continue to regard the C series as non-directional.5 
 
At this point in the argument an important difference between the C+A model and Ricoeur's hermeneutic 
description should be apparent. The episodic dimension of time does not seem to resemble the C series 
but rather the B series, a mere sequence: "The events must not only be registered within the chronological 
framework of their original occurrence but narrated as well, that is to say, revealed as possessing a 
structure, an order of meaning, that they do not possess as a mere sequence." (White 1987, 5) There are 
reasons to suspect that this characterisation of the episodic dimension constitutes an explanatory 
oversight in the hermeneutic model. McTaggart (1927, §724) argued that we always only misperceive the 
C series as the B series: "in the C series, which is perceived as the B series, we had seen that its perception 
as a time-series, connected by the relations of earlier and later, is a misperception." To identify something 
as an episode there must already be a sense of ontological continuity between episodes. That is, episodes 
form a series only if they apply to the same world. For example, when we watch snippets of footage in a 
particular order we only perceive multiple states of the medium, not a sequence of prima facie episodes 
which would already presuppose a narrative, a story, which is yet to be configured. Before configuring 
what has happened (the story) across multiple episodes we must be aware that the multiple states of the 
medium we interpret as episodes are ontologically related in the right way. In essence, without 
ontological continuity underwriting the mere sequence of episodes there would be no sense in referring to 
information as composed of episodes, and ontological continuity is not a feature of the B series but only of 
the C series. If this is correct then the episodic dimension in the hermeneutic model is in fact the C series 
misinterpreted as the B series. 
 
In order to efficiently account for ontological continuity and consistency (across a system of objects) I 
propose the following definition of the ontological structure of a world, configured by means of multiple, 
object-specific C series, instead of positing a single C series of unmanageable complexity for the entire 
world. This way of formulating ontological relations allows for analysis of small parts of a world or single 
objects, provided we can define their boundary conditions. 
 
 C-structure: an ontological hierarchy of a world, where every order of constitutive states of an 
 object, a C series, can be situated with respect to other C series and assigned a unique historical 
 identity that reflects its situation. 
 
The basic element of the C series is a constitutive state of an object, defined by the object's relations with 
all other objects (its situation). Every state in the constitutive sequence is ontologically conditional on 
prior states (ontological continuity), we can therefore say that the object includes all the states 
constitutive of its present state as its constitutive parts. The sequence is thus structurally ordered, doing 
all the ordering work of the B series, apart from defining the temporal direction, but also relating the 
present state of the object to all other objects in the same world (I take being-in-a-world as the sense of 
being an object). A simple C-structure can be modelled as follows: 
 
                                           
5 An alternative approach would be to define the C series as directional and the A series as non-
directional. The main consideration here is that directionality needs to be included in the model only 
once. Having two directional series in the same model could plausibly lead to temporal inconsistencies.  
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The C-structure consists of points a, b, c, d belonging in a world abcd, defined by their relative positions. 
In the above representation it is not immediately clear how the situation is included in the subsequent 
situation'; this aspect will be formalised in the last substantive section of this paper. Since all points 
(objects) are ontologically related (co-exist) in the C-structure there can be no ambiguity about temporal 
relations between their states in any situation (co-existence in a situation entails simultaneity), but before 
incorporating temporality into the model I will address some phenomenological worries about the 
present moment. 
 
 
5. The Missing Present 
 
Husserl (1991, 11-12) has famously argued that the temporal scope of conscious experience is not 
confined to an instant but is extended in time. For example, when we listen to music we do not perceive 
just the sound emitted in the present moment, but experience a sense of melody that necessarily 
implicates related sounds from the immediate past. Melody must therefore be experienced in a different 
temporal context to that of the physical sound. But the premise of apprehension of sound is further 
complicated by the fact that frequency, a distinct pitch, cannot be apprehended instantaneously, in zero 
duration, but requires at least one complete wave-cycle of the signal to physically convey the necessary 
information. Since it 'takes time' to first play and then to register the signal, the experience of physical 
sound (or any other signal) cannot possibly belong to any particular, objective present, insofar as the 
present has zero duration. If, on the other hand, the present had a finite duration, as the theory of 
specious present would have it, it would necessitate simultaneity of all the elements within that duration, 
but that is clearly not the case: we perceive melody as a sequence of tones and not as a single chord, we 
perceive progressive motion and not a static blur (Cf. Husserl, 1991, 11). Conversely, if the specious 
present had already contained motion, the end point of its movement would be in the present when the 
starting point had already elapsed and thus belonged (paradoxically) to a 'different present', therefore 
not the present.  
 
Chuard (2011) argues that temporal continuity of consciousness may be sufficiently explained by partial 
overlapping of events, but this hypothesis ultimately faces the same logical impasse as the idea of 
specious present. Assuming two nominally consecutive events A (earlier) and B (later), if there is a part of 
A that is non-simultaneous with any part of B, then it is necessarily followed by another part of A which is 
simultaneous with a part of B, and then by a part of B that is non-simultaneous with any part of A. In 
effect, the two nominal events are broken up into three consecutive specious parts that are not 
overlapping: A alone, A and B occurring simultaneously, and B alone. Each of the consecutive parts must 
have positive information-content in order to be registered. 
 
Husserl attempted to solve the problem of continuity of consciousness by positing the idea of temporal 
retention. "The source-point with which the production of the enduring object begins is a primal 
impression. (…) But when consciousness of the tone-now, the primal impression, passes into retention, 
  Situation    C-structure   Situation' 
 
a'(0,0) 
b'(1,0) 
c'(0,1) 
d'(2,2) 
a(0,0) 
b(1,0) 
c(0,1) 
d(1,1) 
⊂ 
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this retention itself is a now in turn, something actually existing." (Husserl 1991, 30-31) The thesis of 
retention has one critical problem: in order to retain information there must be a positive information-
content to begin with, but if the primal impression, the source-point, has a positive information-content 
then it is already specious and we again face the explanatory burden associated with the idea of specious 
present. If, on the other hand, speciousness of the source-point associated with the "running-off modes of 
the object's duration" (like melody) were meant to be the result of retention rather than its cause, then 
the source-point would have no duration and therefore no objective content that could be retained. 
 
Explaining continuity of consciousness in terms of specious present, partial overlapping of events or 
temporal retention may be interpreted as involving two distinct conceptions of time: the inner duration 
of the specious present which is measured with respect to a conventional time-reference, normally 
registered in terms of standardised, super-fine cycles of the atomic clock, while the experiential moment 
refers to the phenomenal sense of time, which is registered in terms of subjectively construed meaningful 
events and their internal, logically ordered relations. Since the atomic time-measure is cyclical, that is, it 
also consists of discrete specious moments, we must conclude that the finest detectable duration – the 
signal quantum of atomic radiation – can be defined only in terms of abstract, continuous time, which is in 
principle infinitely divisible. 
 
A logical consequence of this brief examination of the alleged 'missing present' is that an object is 
apprehended neither in the objective present demarcated on a continuous dimension, where only 
infinitesimal and therefore empty instants can be consistently said to be present; nor in the fait accompli 
realm of the past, where experience is said to have expired; nor in the future, which lacks realisation. The 
infinitesimal instants of 'now' carry no meaningful content, no signal, which could be defined only across 
a finite duration. All experience is therefore left without a temporal home, without a place in time, and the 
logic of temporal succession taken to its limit demands that it ought not to appear, let alone change, but 
appearances persist nonetheless. 
 
I postulate that in the absence of information-content in the objective present, appearances must arise 
atemporally; not 'in' time but 'with' time. When we refer to the present we quantify over the existence of 
a unique relational configuration that presupposes the necessity of change from one configuration to 
another. In other words, we perceive events as tentative unities of meaning that presuppose internal 
alterity of states as well as the configurational qualities of being preceded, perceived and succeeded. Our 
subjective sense of time may then be indexed in terms of meaningful moments, as objectified 'instants' 
that are nonetheless characterised by inner duration because their meaning posits or necessitates 
duration. In the words of Husserl, "every act of apprehension is itself a constituted immanent duration-
unity." (Husserl 1991, 123) Cf. "We either perceive nothing, or something already there in sensible 
amount. This fact is what in psychology is known as the law of the 'threshold'. Either your experience is of 
no content, of no change, or it is of a perceptible amount of content or change." (James 1916, 155) 
 
Speciousness attributed to the moment is evidently not 'in the moment' in the physical sense, but 'in the 
meaning of the moment', and is interpolated between practically relevant reference points in the 
atemporal order of constitutive relations (the C-structure). When we perceive a flash of light, we ascribe a 
short duration to the moment of its apprehension; when we experience a single tone, the duration 
ascribed to it may be in the order of a second; when we hear a melody, the moment of its apprehension 
may last several seconds. It is irrelevant whether the flash of light, the single tone or the melody are 
perceived as something objectively present or are just imagined, because in either case we must 
interpolate a suitable duration for the event to be meaningfully assimilated into our intrinsically temporal 
system of meanings. By existentially quantifying over a particular evental identity we arguably invoke a 
window of time for the event to be realised as the present and this constitutes the characteristic duration 
of its phenomenal moment. "The existential now is determined by the present of preoccupation…" 
(Ricoeur 1984, 63) Another way: "Because the Dasein is expectant of itself by way of the feasible, that 
with which it is dealing at the moment is in its present." (Heidegger 1988, 290) As these quanta of 
duration are arranged in a sequence of logically emplotted phenomena, the sense of time becomes a 
continuous presence, a background pulse that can be disrupted only by unconsciousness, but then the 
existential narrative and its inner time are seamlessly re-established upon awakening, by relying on 
countless indexing references within the constitutive structure of resumed 'real' experience. 
 
The takeaway here is that the present of lived experience is not a point in time but already a temporally 
extended, meaningful event ranging over multiple constitutive states which are in themselves atemporal. 
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The ideal point of the Present can nonetheless be inscribed as the metaphysical locus of phenomenal 
experience. In the next section I will attempt to formulate a C+A-theoretic account of time that 
incorporates a systemically consistent ontology of past, present and future change for a hypothetical 
observer whose conception of past changes can also change. 
 
 
6. Ontology of Change 
 
I have argued that McTaggart's paradox implies that events happen at some specific time in the sequence 
of events but also endure in time indefinitely, but this is an obvious contradiction if time is one-
dimensional; therefore either the premises of McTaggart's argument are inconsistent or the 'momentary' 
happening and the 'indefinite' enduring of the same event are both true but in a different temporal sense. 
Understanding this difference is crucial to understanding why change, insofar as it relates to temporal 
phenomena, cannot be consistently modelled in one-dimensional time. 
 
It is a presupposition of empirical science that the thing-itself and the idea of that thing can both change 
in time, independently of one another. For example, the idea of a thing can change when we conceive of 
something about things that we did not conceive of before, and this newly conceived of property 
necessitates a new idea of what that thing always was and how it related to other things in the past. In 
effect, a new historical identity of a thing retroactively replaces a former identity. The implicit ontological 
commitment associated with this substitution is that the new historical identity of the thing is true, 
therefore it is the thing of the past, and the former identity is false, therefore it is not the thing of the past. 
This intuitively makes sense because in one dimensional time a thing can have only one true identity, "for 
it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing" (Aristotle 1984b, 1006b), but if the 
past identity of the thing (x) is not the same as the present identity, then we have not merely changed our 
idea of what that thing always was but identified different things. This much is implied by the law of 
identity: ∀x(x=x). 
 
Since we can identify things only in terms of ideas, the idea of a thing and the thing-itself cannot be fully 
disentangled; despite being different logical types (of ideas), these are conceptually indispensable aspects 
of the same, ontologically continuous object-identity. The law of identity implies that change in the thing-
itself makes sense only when conceived in terms of the same idea of a thing, and vice versa. This, I argue, 
requires two-dimensional time, or more specifically, two atemporal dimensions that only together 
constitute time. On the first dimension, the thing-itself undergoes changes of state; for every constitutive 
state, the idea of the thing is fixed for all of history (past, present and future) on the second dimension. 
Conversely, the thing-itself remains the same insofar as it is the entire sequence of the constitutive states, 
whereas the idea of the thing changes at every step of the constitutive sequence. The sequence grows 
when new constitutive states are added and the preceding state is included as a constitutive part of the 
new state, ensuring ontological continuity from state to state. On this account, even the ship of Theseus 
can be identified as the same ship despite its every part being replaced by a new part. 
 
A possible objection to this line of reasoning is that the constitutive states of a thing are also identities of 
sorts, that is, they are ideas that refer to other ideas, ad infinitum, and as ideas they too can change. Does 
that mean that we need infinitely-dimensional time to accommodate the possibility of change in the 
identities of the referents of ideas? I contend that when we talk about higher-order identities we are 
already talking about different identities, with their own constitutive states. A change of focus from one 
identity to another within the same ontologically continuous space does not entail a different dimension 
of time but only a different thing. The crucial point is that every identity has its own aetiology and 
therefore its own constitutive sequence, but all identities and their constitutive states are ontologically 
grounded in the same phenomenal impressions, registered in terms of qualia characteristic of a species. I 
doubt whether the C-structure of a world could be effectively modelled just in terms of qualia because 
these seem to lack the kind of information-content that could capture ontological continuity of the series. 
In any case, the relational content associated with 'constitutive states' will allow for a more intuitively 
comprehensible model.  
 
I will now focus on formalising a C+A-theoretic account of change subject to considerations discussed 
above. 
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When we say that x has changed we imply two things: first, a relative change of x with respect to not-x 
and, second, ontological continuity of x being unaffected by that change. In other words, the nominal 
identity x endures despite constitutive differences within the object identified as x: "change needs identity 
as well as difference." (Mellor 1998, 89) This, we can say, is the sense of change. The above description 
applies to total replacement of a thing as much as to partial change in the constitution of a thing, because 
replacement is meaningful only if there is an enduring placeholder or a functional identity that answers 
the question of what is being re-placed. 
 
Insofar as we are committed to a temporal direction, change also implies that something is created in 
addition to that which existed prior to the change, a new constitutive part of the object (x) undergoing 
change: nominally, x+Δx takes the identity of x. The content of change (Δx), the pure difference between 
two constitutive states of x, had no existence prior to the change, but once realised it cannot be erased 
from the constitutive sequence of the object. Any subsequent change only adds to the sequence, but as the 
prior state in the sequence is no longer a feature of phenomenal experience, we can say that it is 
temporally negated. "By negating a concept, one only manages to create another concept." (Kojève 1980, 
256)6 The negated state is retained in the C-structure as a condition that gives meaning to its subsequent 
negation.  
 
We can now temporalise the C-structure of the abcd-world by taking account of past (negated) 
constitutive states of objects (○), the content of change (Δ), and ontological continuity via inclusion (⊂). 
All objects (●) are simultaneously present in a given situation. The following diagram shows two 
consecutive situations, where t and ti signify, respectively, the condition included in its immediate 
conditional: 
 
 
 
The above diagram represents ontological continuity between two consecutive states of the world, but in 
order to formally characterise this difference as change from one state to the other we must still integrate 
the A series with the atemporal C-structure. This is accomplished in the next diagram: a two-dimensional 
time-matrix for the object d. The constitutive sequence (horizontal axis) is a C series and signifies the 
included in, inclusive of order of states of the object. The object d is in continuous existence over a lifespan 
of four normalised increments (t) in the constitutive sequence. The historical dimension - vertical axis - 
represents the temporal relations of past, present and future states of the object (the A series). Every 
indexed state in the constitutive sequence marks a distinct historical conception of the object for an 
observer who is simultaneous with that state. For the reader, the correct historical conception is dV, 
consisting of four negated constitutive states.  
 
                                           
6 Cf. "There is no such thing as ceasing to exist (…). When we say that something has ceased to exist we 
only mean that it has ceased to be present; and this only means that the sum total of existence has 
increased." (Broad 1923, 69) 
C-structure at t    C-structure at t
i
 
 
ai(0,0) 
bi(1,0) 
ci(0,1) 
di(2,2) 
a(0,0) 
b(1,0) 
c(0,1) 
d(1,1) di(1,1) 
∆ 
⊂ 
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The fenced-off areas in the time-matrix mark two distinct historical conceptions of d corresponding to the 
two least inclusive constitutive states in the C series: {d, di...}. The historical conception at t consists of the 
'present' constitutive state only - d has no history at t; the historical conception at ti consists of the 
'present' constitutive state and includes a past constitutive state under historical conception di. The future 
situations are shown only to represent the range of expectations that would be true for an observer 
simultaneous with the relevant state in the constitutive sequence. In the proposed model, the future does 
not 'arrive' or 'become' the present; what we identify as a future state via expectation is always 
contextually different from the conception of a state that presently appears, and from any past state we 
can recall.  
 
I summary, the C series (horizontal axis) corresponds to the differences between constitutive states of the 
object, whereas temporal continuity, the direction of change and the experiential locus of the present are 
all properties of the A series. Since the C-structure embodies external ontological relations at every step 
in the constitutive sequence it has a topological-coordinative effect that precludes temporal 
inconsistencies and, consequently, a compatible time-matrix can be constructed for any object in the 
same world. 
 
In formulating the C+A theory of time I have relied on analytical insights of McTaggart and Ricoeur, but 
the underlying schema of the model may have been conceived by Hegel. The following fragment from 
"Phenomenology of Spirit" appears to describe the C series: "individuality is constituted by the shapes 
assumed by these moments. These (...) are distinguished from one another in Time, though in such a way 
that the later moment retains within it the preceding one." (1977, §679) Hegel then describes temporal 
perception as having two aspects: "it is from one side a shape of consciousness as such, and from the 
other side a number of such shapes which we bring together, in which the totality of the moments of the 
object and of the relation of consciousness to it can be indicated only as resolved into its moments." 
(1977, §789). From these we can plausibly infer that time, for Hegel, is a nested order of momentary 
shapes that can be attributed to a particular thing only in virtue of a totalised identity that nominally 
endures in those moments as they arise and pass away, but is also augmented by every passing moment. If 
this is right then Hegel deserves credit as the first proponent of the C+A schema. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
McTaggart's argument that every event possesses contradictory qualities of being past, present and 
future implies that events happen at some specific time in the apparent sequence of events but also 
endure indefinitely in time and change in their temporal properties, but this leads to an obvious 
contradiction if time is one-dimensional. I have attempted to eliminate McTaggart's paradox by modelling 
time on two dimensions; the first dimension designating the states of things signified by ideas, and the 
second dimension designating changes in the ideas signifying those things. Maintaining this distinction 
also allows us to consistently accommodate the alleged backward causation in being able to non-
paradoxically change history by changing our present ideas about the past. 
 
The C+A model is ontologically grounded in the atemporal, nesting order of constitutive states of the 
world, the C-structure, composed of multiple C series, each signifying a unique object defined in relation 
to all other objects. This guarantees ontological continuity and temporal consistency of the model. The C-
structure is then projected orthogonally in terms of McTaggart's A series, which configures the temporal 
relations between the constitutive states of objects and the observer. Every object includes all the states 
logically prior to its present state as its constitutive parts, but only the present state has phenomenal 
appearance. The phenomenal present is explained not as a point on a continuous dimension but a 
temporally extended meaningful moment whose duration is interpolated between practically relevant 
reference points in the C-structure. A continuous dimension is thus abstracted from discrete phenomena, 
allowing us to inscribe the ideal point of the Present as the metaphysical locus of phenomenal experience.  
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